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Abstract. Norms represent what ought to be done, and their fulfillment can be
seen as benefiting the overall system, society or organisation. However, individ-
ual agent goals (desire) may conflict with system norms. If a decision to com-
ply with a norm is determined exclusively by an agent or, conversely, if norms
are rigidly enforced, then system performance may be degraded, and individual
agent goals may be inappropriately obstructed. To prevent such deleterious effects
we propose a general framework for argumentation-based resolution of conflicts
amongst desires and norms. In this framework, arguments for and against com-
pliance are arguments justifying rewards, respectively punishments, exacted by
‘enforcing’ agents. The arguments are evaluated in a recent extension to Dung’s
abstract argumentation framework, in order that the agents can engage in met-
alevel argumentation as to whether the rewards and punishments have the re-
quired motivational force. We provide an example instantiation of the framework
based on a logic programming formalism.
1 Introduction
Requirements for conflict resolution arise in open multi-agent systems in which goals
of individual agents conflict with norms imposed by the system to regulate individual
agent behaviour. If the decision to comply with a norm is determined exclusively by
an individual, then system performance may be degraded. Hence, institutional or social
pressure to comply may be brought about by system agents exacting punishments and
grants rewards [17, 11]. This may be appropriate for closed static systems, but compro-
mises the flexibility of dynamic open systems in which rigid enforcement of norms may
lead to both unwarranted obstruction of agent goals and degraded system performance.
For example, an agent’s goal may be obstructed by enforcing compliance with a norm
that is justified by system-held beliefs about the context. However, these beliefs may be
erroneous. In addition, it may not always be able to anticipate at design time, contexts
in which compliance with norms does or does not coincide with the best interests of
the system, and when enforcement mechanisms have insufficient motivational force. In
such cases, an agent might appeal to higher level motivations [9], arguing that in pur-
suing its own goal it is indeed acting in the interests of the system as a whole, or that
exacted punishments (or rewards) for non-compliance (or compliance) are outweighed
by the benefits of pursing its own goal.
In this paper we propose a general argumentation-based framework that evaluates
arguments for and against compliance with norms, in order to prevent unwarranted
obstruction of individual goals and degraded system performance. As in [11, 6], norms
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are interpreted as system goals that individual agents are required to realise, and that
may conflict with the individual goals or desires of an agent. Punishments and rewards
are the individual goals of system agents responsible for enforcement. In general, an
argument for a goal justifies realisation of that goal based on beliefs that are themselves
the outcome of argumentation based reasoning about what is the case. An argument for
a system goal may then mutually attack an argument for a conflicting individual goal,
and arguments for punishment and reward goals attack the argument for an individual
goal. It is the success of these attacks that determines which of the arguments prevail
and thus whether or not there is a reasoned case for compliance1. In general, an attack
succeeds as a defeat if the attacked argument is not stronger than or preferred to its
attacker [1]. As in [4], preferences may be derived from a relative ordering on the values
that the arguments promote. In this paper, preferences among arguments for goals are
similarly evaluated. For example, a ‘reward argument’ will successfully attack (defeat)
an argument for an individual goal if an agent is persuaded that the reward is of greater
utility to it than the individual goal it is required to abandon in favour of compliance
with the system goal. The proposed framework will thus need to account for:
1. Social mechanisms for enforcing compliance: An agent Ag’s argument for an
individual goal g may be attacked by arguments for the (punishment and reward)
goals g′, . . . of other agents, where the attacks are not based on direct conflicts
between g and g′, . . .. For example, a reward (punishment) may facilitate (hinder)
some other goal that Ag is already committed to realising.
2. Motivational argumentation: Flexible and adaptive agents need to engage in mo-
tivational argumentation over the respective merits of goals. Hence, argumentation
frameworks in which preferences [1] and value orderings [4] on arguments are
‘given’, and not themselves subject to reasoning, do not suffice. Rather, there is a
requirement for argumentation based reasoning over the preferences themselves.
Existing work addresses argumentation-based resolution of conflicts among goals
([2], [10], [16]), and [16] explicitly considers conflicts between individual goals and
norms. However, no existing work accounts for social mechanisms, whereby an agent’s
decision as to which goals to pursue is influenced by other agents’ goals. Only [10]
accounts for argumentation over preferences, but does so in the object level logic pro-
gramming language, whereby rules express priorities over other rules. In this paper, we
aim at an abstract framework in which preferences are not restricted to rule priorities,
but can account for any criteria for valuating argument strength, including those that
relate to the argument as a whole (e.g., as in [4]). We therefore make use of a recent ex-
tension to Dung’s seminal abstract argumentation semantics [8]. In a Dung framework,
arguments are related by a binary conflict-based relation, and the winning (justified) ar-
guments under different extensional semantics are evaluated. The underlying logic, and
definition of the logic’s constructed arguments and conflict relation, is left unspecified,
enabling instantiation by various logical formalisms. Dung’s semantics thus serves as
a general framework capturing various species of non-monotonic reasoning [5], and,
more generally for conflict resolution. Hence, approaches to argumentation based agent
1 In philosophical parlance we are adopting an externalist rather than internalist view, where the
latter consider norms to be intrinsically motivating.
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reasoning often conform to these semantics, whereby an agent’s inferences (e.g. denot-
ing beliefs or goals) can be defined in terms of the claims of the justified arguments
constructed from the underlying theory (an argument essentially being a proof of a can-
didate inference — the argument’s claim — in the underlying logic). In [12, 13], Dung’s
semantics have been extended to accommodate arguments that express preferences be-
tween other arguments, where no assumption is made as to how these preferences are
defined in the instantiating formalism.
In Section 2 we review the extended semantics described in [12, 13]. The main
contributions of this paper are then described in Sections 3, 4 and 5. In Section 3 we
describe a general framework for argumentation based resolution of conflicts between
system norms and agent goals. Specifically, we combine the extended argumentation
semantics with the normative model of [11] in which compliance with norms is en-
forced through punishments and rewards modelled as the goals of enforcement agents.
The framework thus provides for social mechanisms for enforcing compliance, and mo-
tivational argumentation. Section 4 then describes a logic programming instantiation of
the general framework. Section 5 illustrates the instantiation with an extended example.
Finally, Section 6 concludes with a discussion of related and future work.
2 Extended Argumentation Frameworks for Agent Reasoning
2.1 Dung’s Argumentation Framework
A Dung argumentation framework is a tuple (Args,R) where R ⊆ (Args × Args)
can denote either an ‘attack’ or ‘defeat’ relation, and where the latter can be understood
as an attack that succeeds given the available preference information. An argument
A ∈ Args is defined as acceptable w.r.t. some S ⊆ Args, if for every B such that
(B,A) ∈ R, there exists a C ∈ S such that (C,B) ∈ R. Intuitively, C ‘reinstates’ A.
Dung then defines the acceptable extensions of (Args,R) under different extensional
semantics. In this paper we focus on the admissible and preferred semantics. Letting
S ⊆ Args be conflict free if no two arguments in S are related by R, then:
Definition 1. Let S ⊆ Args be a conflict free set.
– S is admissible iff each argument in S is acceptable w.r.t. S
– S is a preferred extension iff S is a set inclusion maximal admissible extension
An argument is said to be justified if it belongs to all preferred extensions of a frame-
work.
2.2 Motivating Extended Argumentation Frameworks
We now motivate extending Dung’s framework with the following example (that will
be referred to later in Section 3).
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Example 1. Consider two agents Ag1 and Ag2 exchanging arguments A, B . . . about
the weather forecast for Hawaii.
Ag2 : “According to the BBC it will be cool in Hawaii” = A
Ag1 : “According to CNN it will be hot in Hawaii” = B
Ag2 : “But the BBC are more trustworthy than CNN” = C
Ag1 : “However, statistics show CNN are more accurate than the BBC” = D
Ag1 : “And a statistical comparison is more rigorous and rational than basing a com-
parison on your instincts about their relative trustworthiness” = E
Arguments A and B symmetrically attack, i.e., (A,B),(B,A) ∈ R. {A} and {B}
are the preferred extensions, and so neither argument is justified. We then have argument
C claiming that A is preferred to B. Hence B does not successfully attack (defeat) A,
but A does defeat B. Intuitively, C is an argument for A’s repulsion of, or defence
against, B’s attack on A; i.e., C attacks B’s attack on A (∆2 in Figure 1a)) so that B’s
attack on A does not succeed as a defeat. B’s attack on A is, as it were, cancelled out,
and we are left with A defeating B. Evaluating the preferred extensions on the basis of
R denoting the defeat relation, we now have the single preferred extension containing
A. Now, given D claiming a preference for B over A and so attacking A’s attack on B,
neither defeat the other and so once again we have two preferred extensions. Since C
and D claim contradictory preferences they attack each other (∆3). These attacks can
themselves be subject to attacks in order to determine the defeat relation between C and
D and, in so doing A and B. E attacks the attack from C to D (∆4), so that D defeats
C, B defeats A, and Ag1’s argument that it will be hot in Hawaii is now justified.
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Fig. 1. Motivating EAFs
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2.3 Defining Extended Argumentation Frameworks
Example 1 illustrates requirements for arguments attacking attacks. Hence, as in [12,
13], an Extended Argumentation Framework is defined as follows:
Definition 2. An Extended Argumentation Framework (EAF) is a tuple (Args, R, D)
such that Args is a set of arguments, and:
– R ⊆ Args×Args
– D ⊆ (Args×R)
– If (C, (B,A)), (D, (A,B)) ∈ D then (C,D), (D,C) ∈ R
Notation 1 We may write A ⇀ B to denote (A,B) ∈ R. If in addition (B,A) ∈ R,
then A­ B. Also, D³ (A ⇀ B) denotes (D, (A,B)) ∈ D
The defeat relation is now parameterised w.r.t. some set S of arguments. This accounts
for an attack’s success as a defeat being relative to preference arguments already ac-
cepted in some set S, rather than relative to some externally given preference ordering.
Definition 3. A defeatsS B, denoted by A →S B, iff (A,B) ∈ R and ¬∃D ∈ S s.t.
(D,(A,B)) ∈ D.
Referring to Example 1, A defeats∅ B but A does not defeat{D} B. The notion of a
conflict free set S of arguments is now defined. Notice that it may be that an argument
A asymmetrically attacks an argument B, so that given D ³ (A ⇀ B), neither A
nor B defeatS each other if D ∈ S. This means that both A and B may be accepted
together in the same extension (where any extension is required to be conflict free). For
example, if B is an argument for an action, and A claims that (for example) the action is
too costly, it may be that an agent decides to execute the action while accepting that it is
expensive (in value based argumentation [4], D is an argument claiming that the value
promoted by B’s action is greater than A’s value of ‘cost’). In the following section we
will show that such preference dependent asymmetric attacks are also appropriate when
resolving conflicts between norms and desires.
Definition 4. S is conflict free iff ∀A,B ∈ S: if (A,B) ∈ R then (B,A) /∈ R, and
∃D ∈ S s.t. (D,(A,B)) ∈ D.
The definition of acceptability of an argument A w.r.t. a set S for an EAF is mo-
tivated in some detail in [12, 13]. It references the notion of a reinstatement set for a
defeat, in order that an intuitive requirement on what it means for an argument to be
acceptable w.r.t. an admissible set S of arguments is satisfied: if A is acceptable with
respect to S, then S∪{A} is admissible (referred to as the fundamental lemma in Dung
[8]).
Definition 5. Let S ⊆ Args in (Args,R,D). LetRS = {X1 →S Y1, . . . , Xn →S Yn}
where for i = 1 . . . n, Xi ∈ S. Then RS is a reinstatement set for C →S B, iff:
• C →S B ∈ RS , and
• ∀X →S Y ∈ RS , ∀Y ′ s.t. (Y ′,(X,Y )) ∈ D, ∃X ′ →S Y ′ ∈ RS
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Definition 6. Let (Args,R,D) be an EAF. A ∈ Args is acceptable w.r.t. S ⊆ Args
iff ∀B ∈ Args s.t. B →S A, ∃C ∈ S s.t. C →S B and there is a reinstatement set for
C →S B.
In Figure 1b), A1 is acceptable w.r.t. S1. We have that B1 →S1 A1, and A1 →S1
B1. The latter defeat is itself challenged by B2. However, A2 →S1 B2, which in turn
is challenged by B3. But then, A3 →S1 B3. We have the reinstatement set {A1 →S1
B1, A2→S1 B2, A3→S1 B3} for A1→S1 B1. Also, A is acceptable w.r.t. S2 given
the reinstatement set {C →S2 B,C1 →S2 B1, C2 →S2 B2} for C →S2 B. Finally
A1 is not acceptable w.r.t S3 since no argument in S3 defeatsS3 B4.
Admissible and preferred semantics for EAFs are now given by Definition 1, where
conflict free is defined as in Definition 4. (In [12, 13], the complete, stable and grounded
semantics are similarly defined for EAFs, i.e., in the same way as for Dung frame-
works). Referring to Example 1, {B,D,E} is the single preferred extension. In [12,
13] we show that EAFs inherit many of the fundamental results holding for extensions
of a Dung framework. This suggests that much of the work building on Dung’s frame-
work can readily be reformulated for EAFs, including work on argument game proof
theories and dialogue frameworks. In particular, Dung’s fundamental lemma is satisfied,
implying that the set of all admissible extensions of an EAF form a complete partial or-
der w.r.t. set inclusion, and so for each admissible S there exists a preferred extension
S′ such that S ⊆ S′.
To conclude, the extended semantics accommodates arguments that express prefer-
ences between other arguments, while preserving the abstraction of a Dung framework;
no commitments are made to how preferences are defined in the instantiating logical
formalism. We now make use of the extended semantics in a framework for conflict
resolution in normative systems, and show that the ability to engage in argumentation
based reasoning about, as well as with, defeasible and possibly conflicting preference
information, provides for agent flexibility and adaptability.
3 A Framework for Conflict Resolution in Normative Systems
This section describes a framework in which agents engage in dialogues to decide which
amongst conflicting desire based and normative goals are to be pursued. Agent submit
arguments for goals, where these arguments attack each other, and then engage in moti-
vational argumentation over the relative utility of states in which the goals are realised.
This equates to arguing over preferences between arguments, and so which attacks suc-
ceeds as defeats. The arguments and attacks defined in the course of a dialogue thus
instantiate an EAF, and the goals to be pursued are those claimed by the justified argu-
ments of the EAF. Note that the agents also argue over the beliefs justifying adoption
of goals. In this way, the agents are first required to agree that the goal being proposed
for adoption is indeed warranted by what is believed to be the case. Section 3.1 first sets
out some general assumptions about the kinds of agents modelled by the framework,
and the dialogues these agents participate in. Section 3.2 then describes how conflicts
between individual agent goals and system norms are resolved through argumentation
based dialogues over beliefs, and goals proposed by individual agents and agents acting
on behalf of the system.
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3.1 Agents and Dialogues
The proposed framework abstracts from the logics for agent reasoning, assuming only
BDI type agents (e.g. those instantiating the BOID architecture [7]) and a declarative
interpretation of goals as beliefs holding in some future state. Each agent has a belief
base consisting of facts and rules, and a goal base containing rules for deriving goals.
From amongst all the goals that are derivable, those that an agent commits to realising
are referred to as intentions. An intention persists in an agent’s intention base until such
a time as it is realised by a plan (the agent’s planning component is not modelled here).
As in [11]’s model of normative multi-agent systems, four types of goal are distin-
guished. Individual agent goals, which we refer to here as desires, may conflict with nor-
mative goals. For example, an agent Ag1’s desire to stay on Waikiki beach in Hawaii,
may conflict with the normative goal of staying in a cheap hotel. Ag1 may decide to
comply or not comply with the norm, based on rewards and punishments exacted by
system agents (specifically enforcement agents). Rewards and punishments are also in-
dividual goals of enforcement agents, but are punishment, respectively reward goals,
from the perspective of the agent being punished, respectively rewarded. Punishment
goals hinder the punished agent’s intentions if that agent decides not to comply with
the norm. For example, a punishment may be to deny the funding that Ag1 needs to
fulfill its intention to visit Leipzig for a meeting. Reward goals benefit the achievement
of the rewarded agent’s intentions if it decides to comply. For example, a reward for an
agent who intends to have a laptop, may be to provide the agent with a laptop.
In general, goals are derived by rules whose antecedents refer to what the agent
believes and its current intentions. Extending the scenario described in Example 1, sup-
pose agent Ag1 believes it will be hot in Hawaii, and it intends to attend a conference in
Hawaii. Then it derives the desire to stay on Waikiki beach. The goals of system agents
are derived in the same way, and may additionally refer to the intentions of other agents.
For example, if Ag1 intends to attend a conference, then the normative goal of staying
in a cheap hotel is derived (in either Ag1’s goal base or the goal base of a system agent
responsible for informing other agents of their obligations). An enforcement agent AgP
may derive the punishment goal of denying Ag1 the funding for a meeting, given Ag1’s
intention to attend the meeting, andAgP ’s belief that the meeting is not related to an EU
project. Rules in the goal base can also capture the sub-goal relationship. For example,
if Ag1 intends to visit Leipzig for a meeting, then it derives the sub-goal goal of having
funding for the visit. Finally, we assume argument construction from agents’ bases is
defined in some underlying logic.
Definition 7. Let {Ag1, . . . , Agn} be a set of agents, where for i = 1 . . . n, Agi is
equipped with a belief base Bi, an intention base Ii, and a goal base Gi. For i = 1, let
argument A be constructed from Bi ∪ Gi ∪⋃ni=1 Ii.
If A is constructed only from Bi, then A is a belief argument of Agi, otherwise A is a
goal argument of Agi.
In general, we write bel(A) to denote the beliefs inA. We also write claim(A) to identify
an argument A’s claim.
The basic idea is that individual and system agents engage in argumentation-based
conflict resolution (persuasion) dialogues to determine which amongst the arguments
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for beliefs and goals are justified in the EAFs of Section 2. The goals that are the claims
of justified arguments are then adopted as intentions. In persuasion dialogues (reviewed
in [3]) a proponent makes a claim — the topic of the dialogue — and (one or more)
opponents attempt to persuade the proponent that the claim does not hold. In general
such a dialogue d is a sequence of moves m1, . . . ,mi, . . ., where the first move m1 is a
locution introducing the topic as an assertion or claim of an argument. Here, we simply
assume that the topic of d can be referred to as topic(d). Dialogue protocols vary from
model to model, and specify the legal moves at each stage of the dialogue, where a
move can be an assertion of a proposition or an argument, a challenge to a premise in
an argument, a concession of a proposition or argument, and so on. Models also vary on
the rules for termination of a dialogue. However, in general, the arguments submitted
and constructed (from the propositions asserted) during the course of a dialogue can
be organised into an argumentation framework [15]. If an argument for the topic is
justified, then the proponent wins the dialogue. Formalising dialogue models is to be
addressed in future work. Here, we refer only to an EAF constructed on the basis of a
dialogue.
Definition 8. Let d = m1, . . . ,mn be a terminated dialogue where topic(d) = α, and
AG = {Ag1, . . . , Agm} the participants in d. We say that the EAF ∆ = (Args,R,D)
constructed on the basis of d, is:
– a belief EAF iff every argument in Args is a belief argument of some Ag ∈ AG
– a goal EAF iff every argument in Args is either a belief or goal argument of some
Ag ∈ AG 2
3.2 Arguing about Beliefs and Goals
An agent’s argument A for a desire may conflict with (and so mutually attack) an argu-
ment B for a normative goal. Arguments for punishment and reward goals may in turn
attack A and so reinstate the argument B for the normative goal. The success of these
attacks as defeats depends on argumentation over preferences between the arguments
(corresponding to meta-level motivation-based argumentation over the relative utility
of states in which the goals are realised).
Prior to agents submitting goal arguments in a dialogue, the beliefs in the argument
justifying the goal may themselves by subject to debate 3. In our running example,
Ag1’s desire to stay on Waikiki beach is contingent on its belief that it will be hot in
Hawaii. A system agent may successfully persuade Ag1 that it will be cool in Hawaii.
Hence Ag1 will not submit the argument for its desire, precluding the possibility of
norm violation (in Example 1 the outcome is in favour of Ag1’s argument that it will
be hot). Furthermore, the beliefs in arguments for system goals may be challenged.
2 Of course, in the limiting case where only arguments can be submitted as locutions, then each
mi in d corresponds to an argument in Args, and a protocol for d would require that mi attack
some mj , j < i, or some attack between mj and mk, j < i, k < i
3 Arguing over beliefs justifying a goal prior to arguing over the relative merits of goals pre-
cludes ‘wishful thinking’; i.e., one wouldn’t want that argumentation over which goals to adopt
(which future state to realise) influences what is believed about the current state of the world.
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Thus, an agent may successfully argue that the beliefs justifying a normative goal may
be erroneous; hence the normative goal does not have to be adopted and unwarranted
obstruction of the conflicting desire is prevented. Suppose arguments A and B for the
conflicting goals of staying on Waikiki and staying at a cheap hotel have been submitted.
AgP will not submit an argument C for the punishment goal of denying Ag1 funding
for the Leipzig meeting, if Ag1 successfully persuades AgP that the meeting is related
to an EU project. Again, this prevents unwarranted obstruction of Ag1’s intention to
attend the meeting. Of course, AgP may then be motivated to submit an argument for
an alternative punishment goal to enforce compliance.
Definition 9. Let AG = {Ag1, . . . , Agn}. Then A is an agreed goal argument of Ag ∈
AG if for every α ∈ bel(A):
if there is a terminated dialogue d with topic α, participants AG ⊆ {Ag1, . . . , Agn},
and ∆ is a belief EAF constructed on the basis of d, then α is the conclusion of a
justified argument of ∆.
We now describe how argumentation over goals proceeds. Consider the case where
a normative goal g′ conflicts with a desire g (in the simplest case g′ ≡ ¬g in the
underlying logic). In general, we say that the goal argument A′ for g′ conflicts with the
goal argument A for g. In a goal EAF, A and A′ attack each other since an agent can
either adopt g and not g′, or g′ and not g.
Suppose such an EAF , where Ag1 submits A claiming ‘stay on Waikiki beach’,
and A′ claiming ‘stay in cheap hotel’, mutually attacks A. An enforcement agent can
then submit an argument P for a punishment goal p, that, in the terminology of [11],
hinders some intention ofAg1. In our running example, p = ‘deny funding for meeting’.
Now P does not directly attack on A’s goal; it does so in the sense that if the attack
succeeds, then Ag1 will not pursue its desire, and will comply with the norm. Note
also, that the attack is a preference dependent asymmetric attack. Ag1 might argue (B)
that it is of more value to him to stay on Waikiki beach then attend the meeting. That is,
B ³ (P ⇀ A), and it may now be thatA and P are justified;Ag1 adopts its desire, and
accepts the punishment. An alternative punishment may then need to be submitted to
see if it has the required enforcing effect. Finally, an enforcement agent can submit an
argument R for a reward goal r, that, in the terminology of [11], benefits some intention
of Ag. For example r = ‘provide the agent with a laptop’, benefiting Ag1’s intention to
have a laptop. R symmetrically attacks A. Either Ag1 accepts the reward and drops the
desire, or vice versa.
Definition 10. LetAG= {Ag1, . . . , Agn} be a set of agents. LetArgsG =
⋃
i=1...n{A|A
is a goal argument for Agi}. Let IAG =
⋃
i=1...n Ii. Then:
– conflicts ⊆ ArgsG ×ArgsG
– hinders ⊆ ArgsG × IAG
– benefits ⊆ ArgsG × IAG4
4 Note that an agent’s desires may ‘internally’ conflict. We so not here directly address conflict
resolution in such cases. Note also that an agent’s goals may benefit/hinder its own intentions.
9
Definition 11. Let AG = {Ag1, . . . , Agn}, and for some Ag ∈ AG, let A be a goal
argument of Ag, I the intention base of Ag.
Let A′ be the goal argument of some Ag′ ∈ AG, Ag′ 6= Ag. Then:
– A′ goal attacks A and A goal attacks A′ if conflicts(A′, A) or benefits(A′, ι) for
some ι ∈ I
– A′ goal attacks A if hinders(A′, ι) for some ι ∈ I
We now specify some constraints on a dialogue that begins with a topic that is a
goal proposed for adoption as an intention. We do so by expressing constraints on the
goal EAF constructed on the basis of the dialogue. These are that the goal arguments are
agreed, and can only be attacked by goal arguments as defined above, and only belief
arguments are used in arguing over the relative merits of the goals.
Definition 12. Let AG = {Ag1, . . . , Agn} be a set of agents. Let d be a terminated
dialogue with topic α, and participants AG′ ⊆ AG, where:
– α is the conclusion of an agreed goal argument A of some agent Ag ∈ AG′.
– ∆ = (Args,R,D) is the goal EAF constructed on the basis of d, where:
i) for any goal arguments B,A ∈ Args, (B,A) ∈ R iff A and B are agreed goal
arguments, and B goal attacks A.
ii) If (C,(B,A)) ∈ D then C is a belief argument for some agent in AG′
If the topic α of the dialogue is an agent’s desire, and α is the claim of a justified
argument in the dialogue’s goal EAF, then α is updated to the agent’s intention base,
and any punishment goal that is the claim of a justified argument is updated to the
corresponding enforcement agent’s intention base. If α is not the claim of a justified
argument, and there is a justified argument for a normative goal β, then β is updated to
the agent’s intention base, and any reward goal that is the claim of a justified argument
is updated to the corresponding enforcement agent’s intention base.
4 Instantiating the Framework
In this section we describe an example instantiation of the framework. Agent goals,
beliefs and intentions are represented in [14]’s argument based logic programming
with defeasible priorities (ALP-DP). An ALP-DP theory’s arguments are defined as
sequences of chained rules. Some rules can express priorities on other rules, so that one
can construct priority arguments whose claims determine preferences between other
mutually attacking arguments. Preferences between priority arguments can also be es-
tablished on the basis of other priority arguments. [14] then defines the justified ar-
guments of a theory under Dung’s grounded semantics. In [12, 13] the arguments and
attacks defined by an ALP-DP theory instantiate an EAF, and an equivalence result with
the EAF’s justified arguments (under the grounded semantics) is shown. By giving an
EAF semantics for ALP-DP one can, unlike [14], also:
1. characterise the justified arguments of an ALP-DP theory under the preferred se-
mantics; and
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2. model preference dependent asymmetric attacks.
Both these features are employed when instantiating an EAF. Note that ALP-DP models
both negation as failure and strict negation. To simplify the presentation, we describe
a restricted version of ALP-DP — ALP-DP* — which does not include negation as
failure.
Definition 13. Let (S,D) be a ALP-DP* theory where S is a set of strict rules of the
form s : L0∧ . . .∧Lm → Ln, D a set of defeasible rules r : L0∧ . . .∧Lj ⇒ Ln, and:
– Each rule name r (s) is a first order term. Henceforth, head(r) denotes the conse-
quent Ln of the rule named r.
– Each Li is an atomic first order formula, or such a formula preceded by strong
negation ¬.
Strict rules represent information that is beyond debate (note that neither → nor ⇒
admit contraposition). We also assume that the language contains a two-place predicate
symbol≺ for expressing priorities on rule names, and that any S includes the following
strict rules expressing the properties of a strict partial order on ≺:
• o1 : (x ≺ y) ∧ (y ≺ z)→ (x ≺ z)
• o2 : (x ≺ y) ∧ ¬(x ≺ z)→ ¬(y ≺ z)
• o3 : (y ≺ z) ∧ ¬(x ≺ z)→ ¬(x ≺ y)
• o4 : (x ≺ y)→ ¬(y ≺ x)
Definition 14. An argument A based on the theory (S,D) is:
1. a finite sequence [r0, . . . , rn] of ground instances of rules such that
– for every i (0 ≤ i ≤ n), for every literal Lj in the antecedent of ri there is a
k < i such that head(rk) = Lj .
We say that claim(A) = head(rn), and if head(rn) = x ≺ y then A is called a
‘singleton priority argument’.
– no distinct rules in the sequence have the same head
or
2. a finite sequence [r01 , . . . rn1 ,. . .,r0m , . . . rnm ], such that for i= 1 . . .m, [r0i , . . . rni ]
is a singleton priority argument. We say that A is a ‘composite priority argument’
and claim(A) = head(rn1 ). . .head(rnm) is the ordering claimed by A
In [14], arguments are exclusively defined by item 1. We additionally define composite
priority arguments so that an ordering, and hence a preference, can be claimed by a
single argument rather than a set of arguments (as in [14]).
Definition 15. For any arguments A, A′ and literal L:
– A is strict iff it does not contain any defeasible rule; it is defeasible otherwise.
– L is a conclusion of A iff L is the head of some rule in A
– If T is a sequence of rules, then A+ T is the concatenation of A and T
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Note that an argument has only one claim, but may have many conclusions corre-
sponding to the heads of the contained rules. We now instantiate the abstract definition
7 of an agent and its constructed arguments. Note that intentions are represented by
the goal arguments that have previously been used to justify their adoption. Hence, an
agent’s goal arguments will be constructed from its belief and goal base, and the claims
(named by the name of the rule whose head is the claim) of intention arguments in all
agents’ intention bases.
Definition 16. Let {Ag1, . . . , Agn} be a set of agents, where for i = 1 . . . n:
- Bi and Gi are ALP-DP* theories, and Ii is a set of arguments.
- A is a belief argument of Agi iff it is based on Bi
- A is a goal argument of Agi iff it is based on Bi ∪ Gi∪
⋃
i=1...n{r : claim(B)|B ∈
Ii, head(r) = claim(B)}
[14] motivates definition of attacks between arguments that account for the ways in
which arguments can be extended with strict rules:
Definition 17. A1 attacks A2 on the pair (L,¬L) if there are sequences S1 and S2 of
strict rules such that A1 + S1 is an argument with conclusion L and A2 + S2 is an
argument with a conclusion ¬L.
In the following example illustrating attacks between belief arguments, we will
without loss of generality simply assume that all beliefs are contained in a single theory.
Only in the example at the end of this section, in which we illustrate argumentation over
goals, will we identify the individual agents involved. Following [14], every rule with
terms t1, . . . , tn is named with a function expression r(t1, . . . , tn) where r is the rules’s
informal name. For example, r(p(X,Y ), q(X,Y )) names the rule p(X,Y )⇒ q(X,Y ).
To maintain readability we will only write the function-symbol part of the rule name,
and as an abuse of notation, arguments will be represented as sequences of rule names
rather than the rules these names identify.
Example 2. Let tr(X,Y ), st(X,Y ) and ra(X,Y ) respectively denote that X is more
trustworthy, statistically accurate, and rational than Y .
Let S = {o1 . . . o4} ∪ {s1 : temp(X, cool)→ ¬temp(X,hot),
s2 : temp(X,hot)→ ¬temp(X, cool)}.
Let D = {bbc :⇒ temp(hawaii, cool),
cnn :⇒ temp(hawaii, hot),
c1 :⇒ tr(bbc, cnn),
d1 :⇒ st(cnn, bbc),
c2 : tr(X,Y )⇒ Y ≺ X,
d2 : st(X,Y )⇒ Y ≺ X,
e1 :⇒ ra(d2, c2),
e2 : ra(X,Y )⇒ Y ≺ X}
A = [bbc], B = [cnn], C = [c1, c2], D = [d1, d2].
E = [e1, e2] with conclusions ra(d2, c2) and c2 ≺ d2, and claim c2 ≺ d2.
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A and B attack each other since A+ s1 has conclusion
¬temp(hawaii, hot) and B has conclusion temp(hawaii, hot). C and D attack each
other since C has conclusion cnn ≺ bbc and D + o4 has conclusion ¬(cnn ≺ bbc)
We now define the relations conflicts, hinders and benefits, and goal attacks for
ALP-DP* goal arguments. Note that the notion of benefits requires that a goal argument
of a rewarding agent be extended (as in the definition of attack) with strict rules that link
the reward goal to the intention that it benefits (this will be illustrated in the example
concluding this section).
Definition 18. Let A be a goal argument of an agent Ag and I the intention base of
Ag.
Let B be any goal argument of an agent Ag′, where B′ = (S′, D′) is the belief base of
Ag′. We say that:
• conflicts(B,A) if B attacks A as in definition 17.
For any I ∈ I:
• hinders(B, I) if B attacks I as in definition 17
• benefits(B, I) if claim(B+S1) = claim(I) for some possibly empty sequence of strict
rules S1 in S′
Then:
– B and A goal attack each other on the pair
(claim(B), claim(A)) if conflicts(B,A)
– B and A goal attack each other on the pair
(claim(B), claim(A)) if benefits(B, I) for some I ∈ I
– B goal attacks A on the pair
(claim(B), claim(A)) if hinders(B, I) for some I ∈ I
To determine a preference amongst attacking arguments, [14] defines the sets of rel-
evant defeasible rules to be compared, and an ordering on these sets. Here, the ordering
on such sets is based on the ordering claimed by a given priority argument.
Definition 19. If A+S is an argument with conclusion L, the defeasible rules RL(A+
S) relevant to L are:
1. {rd} iff A includes defeasible rule rd with head L
2. RL1(A+ S) ∪ . . . ∪ RLn(A+ S) iff A is defeasible and S includes a strict rule s
: L1 ∧ . . . ∧ Ln → L
Definition 20. Let C be a priority argument claiming the ordering ≺. Let R and R′ be
sets of defeasible rules. Then R′ > R iff ∀r′ ∈ R′, ∃r ∈ R such that r ≺ r′.
Intuitively, R can be made better by replacing some rule in R with any rule in R′,
while the reverse is impossible. Now, given two arguments A and B, it may be that
for belief arguments they attack on more than one conclusion. For goal arguments they
goal attack on a single pair of conclusions (the goals claimed by the arguments). Given
a priority ordering ≺ claimed by argument C, we say that A is preferred≺ to B if for
every pair (L,L′) of conclusions on which they attack, the set of A’s defeasible rules
relevant to L is stronger (>) than the set of B’s defeasible rules relevant to L′.
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Definition 21. Let C be a priority argument claiming ≺. Let (L1, L′1), . . . , (Ln, L′n)
be the pairs on which A attacks, or goal attacks B, where for i = 1 . . . n, Li and L′i
are conclusions in A and B respectively. Then A is preferred≺ to B if for i = 1 . . . n,
RLi(A+ Si) > RL′i(B + S
′
i)
In example 2, C and D attack each other on the pair (cnn ≺ bbc, ¬(cnn ≺ bbc)),
and Rcnn≺bbc(C) = {c2}, R¬(cnn≺bbc)(D) = {d2}. E claims c2 ≺ d2, and so D is
preferredc2≺d2 to C. Note also, that given C, A is preferredcnn≺bbc to B, and given D,
B is preferredbbc≺cnn to A. We can now instantiate an EAF with the arguments, their
attacks, and priority arguments claiming preferences and so attacking attacks:
Definition 22. The EAF (Args, R, D) for a theory (S,D) is defined as follows. Args
is the set of arguments given by definition 14, and ∀A,B,C ∈ Args:
1. (C,(B,A)) ∈ D iff C claims ≺ and A is preferred≺ to B
2. (A,B),(B,A) ∈ R if A and B attack as in definition 17, or A and B goal attack
as in definition 18
The belief EAF obtained by the arguments and attacks for our running example is
shown in figure 1a). {E,D,B} is the single preferred extension of the EAF. We can
now constrain a goal EAF constructed on the basis of a dialogue between agents, as
defined in definition 12.
5 An Extended Example
We now illustrate the previous section’s formalism with an extended version of our
Hawaiian example, in which we assume that every goal argument is agreed.
In what follows we use the following shorthand:
ha = ‘Hawaii’, wa = ‘Waikiki beach’, le = ‘Leipzig’, att, = ‘attend’, conf = ‘confer-
ence’,meet, = ‘meeting’, cheap = ‘cheap hotel’, lap = ’laptop’, fund = ‘have funding’,
and deny f = ‘deny funding’.
Also, predicates may refer to the agents themselves. For example, att(ag, conf, ha) de-
notes the goal of ag to attend a conference in Hawaii. Also, variables will begin with up-
percase letters and constants with lowercase letters. For example, deny f(agP , AgX,
meet, L) denotes the goal of agent agP to deny funding for any agent AgX to attend a
meeting in some location L.
Let {aga, agN , agP , agR} be a set of agents. We describe each agent’s knowledge
bases. Note that we may not show all the goal rules used to construct arguments in
the intention base of each agent. Also, as before, we may simply write the rule name
rather than the rule the name identifies.
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aga:
I =
{ [ia1 :⇒ att(aga, conf, ha)], [ia2 :⇒ att(aga,meet, le)],
[ia2 :⇒ att(aga,meet, le), ia3 : att(aga,meet, le)⇒ funds(aga,meet, le)],
[ia4 :⇒ have(aga, lap)] }
G =
{ ga1 : temp(ha, hot) ∧ att(aga, conf, ha)⇒ stay(aga, wa)}
B =
{ ba0 :⇒ temp(ha, hot),
ba1 :→ norm des(gn1, ga1),
ba self : norm des(X,Y )⇒ X ≺ Y ,
ba2 :⇒ project funds(high),
ba3 : project funds(high)⇒ except(ba self, bn social),
ba excep : except(X,Y )⇒ Y ≺ X ,
ba4 :⇒ gp1 ≺ ga1}
agN :
I = ∅
G = { gn1 : att(AgX, conf, L)⇒ stay(AgX, cheap, L)}
B = { bn1 : stay(AgX, cheap, ha)→ ¬stay(AgX,wa),
bn2 :→ norm des(gn1, ga1),
bn social : norm des(X,Y )⇒ Y ≺ X }
agP :
I = ∅
G = { gp1 : att(AgX,meet, L) ∧ ¬type(meet, eu, L)
⇒ deny f(agP , AgX,meet, L)}
B = { bp1 :⇒ ¬type(meet, eu, le),
bp2 : deny f(agP , AgX,meet, L)→ ¬funds(AgX,meet, L)}
agR:
I = ∅
G = { gr1 : have(AgX, lap)⇒ provide(agR, AgX, lap)}
B = { br1 : provide(agR, AgX, lap)→ have(AgX, lap),
br2 :→ rew des(gr1, ga1),
br rew suffice : rew des(X,Y )⇒ Y ≺ X }
1) aga initiates a dialogue with goal argument A1 = [ba0, ia1, ga1] claiming the goal
stay(aga, wa), having already persuaded a system agent that it will indeed be hot in
Hawaii.
2) agN submits A2 = [ia1,gn1] (AgX = aga, L = ha), where A2 and A1 goal attack
each other (see figure 2) on the pair
(stay(aga, cheap, ha), stay(aga, wa)).
This symmetric goal attack is based on conflicts (A2, A1) which obtains because A2 +
[bn1] andA1 attack (as in def.17) on the conclusion pair (¬stay(aga, wa), stay(aga, wa))
agN also submits the social ordering argument B1 = [bn2, bn social] claiming ga1 ≺
gn1, and so B1³ (A1⇀ A2).
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Fig. 2. EAF based on argumentation based dialogue over goals
3) aga submits:
- the selfish ordering argument B2 = [ba1, ba self ] claiming gn1 ≺ ga1, and so
B2³ (A2⇀ A1)
- an argument claiming that the selfish behaviour type is preferred to the social be-
haviour type given the exceptional circumstances in which the remaining project budget
is high:
C1 = [ba2, ba3, ba excep,] claiming bn social ≺ ba self , and so C1³ (B1⇀ B2).
The single preferred extension contains A1
4) agP attempts to enforce compliance by submitting A3 = [ia2, bp1, gp1] given that it
is agreed that the meeting is not an Eu project meeting.
A3 + [bp2] attacks (as in def.17), and so hinders, aga’s intention [ia2, ia3]. Hence, A3
goal attacks A1 on the pair (deny f(agP , aga,meet, le), stay(aga, wa)).
5) However, aga prefers to stay on the beach and be denied funding by agP for the
leipzig meeting. It may be that aga has another source of funding in mind. We do not
encode the rationale for the preference, but simply assume the priority argument B3
= [ba4] claiming gp1 ≺ ga1. Hence B3 ³ (A3 ⇀ A1). Since A3’s attack on A1 is
asymmetric:
The single preferred extension contains A1 and A3
6) agR attempts to enforce compliance with A4 = [ia4, gr1] offering to provide aga
with a laptop. This benefits aga’s intention to have a laptop since claim([ia4, gr1] +
[br1]) = claim[ia4]. Hence, A4 and A1 goal attack each other (A4 ­ A1) on the pair
(provide(agR, aga, lap), stay(aga, wa)).
agR believes the reward is of sufficient strength that aga will prefer the reward to stay-
ing on Waikiki beach. agR submits B4 = [br2, br rew suffice] claiming ga1 ≺ gr1.
Hence, B4³ (A1⇀ A4). This is accepted by aga and the dialogue terminates.
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The single preferred extension contains A2 and A4
aga’s intention set can then be updated with A2. agR’s intention set can then be updated
with A4. aga intends now to book a cheap room in Hawaii, and agR intends to provide
aga with a laptop.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed a framework for argumentation-based resolution of con-
flicts in normative multi-agent systems, and have illustrated instantiation of the frame-
work with a logic programming formalism. The framework provides for agents to argue
over the beliefs justifying goals, conflicting preferences brought to bear in argumenta-
tion over beliefs, and metalevel motivational argumentation over the states represented
by desire based goals, and normative, punishment and reward goals argued for by other
agents. In this way, unwarranted obstruction of individual agents’ desires is precluded,
and enforcement of compliance can appropriately account for the motivations of the
agents and erroneously held beliefs about the contexts in which the agents find them-
selves.
As mentioned in Section 1, existing approaches to argumentation-based resolution
of conflicts amongst goals ([2],[10],[16]) do not model social mechanisms deployed
to enforce compliance with norms. In [16], norms are represented as bridge rules that
describe the relationships between mental attitudes. Argumentation based resolution of
conflicts amongst goals derived using these rules exploits a preference relation on these
rules. In [2], only conflicts amongst desire based goals are addressed. Argumentation
over the beliefs that justify desires conforms to the Dung semantics. However selection
of desires does not account for their relative importance and does not conform to the
Dung semantics. Rather, the maximal (under set inclusion) sets of desires that can be
consistently realised are chosen. However, goal selection does account for the feasibility
of plans for realising goals, and this is a factor that our work needs to account for in
future work.
Future work will also investigate instantiation of the framework by formalisms with
explicit BDI type modalities. Further work is also required before evaluation of the
framework based on prototypical implementations can proceed. In particular, we intend
development of argument game proof theories, algorithms and dialogue protocols for
EAFs. Since EAFs inherit the fundamental results shown for Dung frameworks, our
approach will adopt the methodologies deployed in specification of game based algo-
rithms [18] and protocols [15] based on the Dung semantics. We also believe that our
approach is applicable to resolution of conflicts arising between an individual agent’s
conflicting desires, and between conflicting norms. Both cases often require reasoning
about abstract values and motivations. Furthermore, conflict resolution may lead to re-
finement and evolution of a system’s norms. Finally, one of the key novel features of
our framework is that an agent’s decision as to which goals to pursue is influenced by
other agents’ goals. We believe that we can abstract from the normative application of
the framework to consider other contexts in which the impact of other agents’ goals can
be modelled through argumentation based mechanisms.
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